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5. Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy?  
 
Economists have long recognized the gains from international trade; their study is where 
modern economics began. Over centuries, international trade has brought together remote 
parts of the world and different civilizations, helped disseminate knowledge and ideas, and 
shaped the course of regions and nations. Rapid reductions in transport and communications 
costs accelerated this trend in the 19
th
 century, and international trade reached unprecedented 
levels at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Trade declined, however, following the two World 
Wars, the 1929 crisis, and the world-wide increase in protectionism. 
 
A reversal in protectionism started after World War II among the industrialized countries, 
and spread to the developing countries in the 1970s. Trade reforms were further expanded 
and consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s across the developing world: in South Asia, East 
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser extent, in Africa and the Middle East. 
Yet in the 1990s, the results of trade reform have varied and sometimes fallen short of 
expectations. Critics of the economic and social effects of globalization have also become 
more vocal. Why have some trade liberalizations been reversed, and why have others brought 
prosperity, opportunities, and economic diversification? Is there still a role for protection of 
infant industries in growth strategies? Does trade liberalization lead to economic growth? 
Finally, does trade liberalization improve or reduce poverty?  
 
Drawing on the experience and academic research of the 1990s, this chapter identifies five 
lessons: 
 
 Openness to trade has been a central element of successful growth strategies. In all 
countries that have sustained growth the share of trade in GDP has increased, and trade 
barriers have been reduced.  
 Trade is an opportunity, not a guarantee. While trade reforms can help accelerate 
integration in the world economy and strengthen an effective growth strategy, they cannot 
ensure its success. Other elements that address binding constraints to growth are needed, 
possibly including sound macroeconomic management, trade-related infrastructure and 
institutions, and economy-wide investments in human capital and infrastructure.  
 There are many possible ways to open an economy. The challenge for policymakers is to 
identify which best suits their country’s political economy, institutional constraints, and 
initial conditions. As these vary from country to country, it is not surprising that there is a 
striking heterogeneity in country experiences regarding the timing and pace of reforms. 
Different countries have opened up different sectors at different speeds (for example 
Bangladesh and India); others have achieved partial liberalization through the establishment 
of export processing zones (for example China and Mauritius); and yet others have combined 
unilateral trade reforms  with participation in regional trade agreements (for example 
Estonia).  
 The distributive effects of trade liberalization are diverse, and not always pro-poor. Trade 
reforms were expected to increase the incomes of the unskilled in countries with a 
comparative advantage in producing unskilled-intensive goods. Yet evidence from the 1990s 
suggests that even in instances where trade policy has reduced poverty, there are still 
distributive issues. One important policy lesson is that countries need to help workers 
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affected move out of contracting (import-competing) sectors into expanding (exporting) 
sectors. This is an issue relevant to both developing and industrialized countries.  
 The preservation and expansion of the world trade system hinges on its ability to strike a 
better balance between the interests of industrialized and developing countries. Global 
markets are the most hostile to the products produced by the world’s poor—such as 
agricultural products and textiles and apparel. The problems of escalating tariffs, tariff peaks, 
and quota arrangements systematically deny the poor market access and skew the incentives 
against adding value in poor countries. These problems can be addressed through collective 
action, best pursued through the Doha Round and the World Trade Organization. Although 
there is a role for non-reciprocal preferences and for reciprocal regional approaches, this 
comes at a cost to excluded countries, is arbitrary and political, and thus not first best in 
terms of generating the right incentives for investment. 
 
1. Trade reform as a component of a successful growth strategy 
 
This chapter begins by reviewing key changes in trade policy, trade volumes, and the 
composition of trade in the 1990s. One striking fact is that trade—measured as a share of 
exports in GDP—is now larger in developing than in developed countries. Another important 
trend is the shift in the composition of developing country exports towards manufactures. 
Countries whose incomes were low in 1980 managed to raise their exports of manufactures 
from about 20 percent of their total exports to more than 80 percent.1  
 
Virtually all successful economies have increased their openness to trade. In part because 
successful trade reforms have been introduced in conjunction with other policy initiatives, it 
is difficult empirically to identify the growth effect of trade policy alone, compared with the 
growth effect of other policy initiatives, and to disentangle whether trade causes growth or 
growth causes trade. As an economy accumulates physical and human capital, shifts its 
comparative advantage towards more capital-intensive activities, and becomes internationally 
competitive in a wider range of goods and services, it will inevitably trade more. But is 
higher trade the result or the cause of its growth? Most likely both processes are at work. 
This section reviews the evidence on these questions and then argues for the need to pursue 
trade reform as part of a comprehensive growth strategy. Openness to the global economy 
has helped efficiency and growth in many cases (East and South Asian countries, Botswana, 
Chile, Mauritius, Tunisia), but it has failed to do so in many others. These experiences do not 
necessarily imply that less trade reform would have been desirable, but that trade reform 
must be done and sequenced sensibly, part of an effective growth strategy.  
 
The 1990s: an overview 
 
                                                 
1
 These changes were not just due to declines in the prices of agricultural and resource commodities relative to 
manufactures—the strong shift in the composition of exports shows up even when price changes are removed. 
Further, it was not just due to a few, large high-growth exporters such as China and India. Excluding China and 
India, the share of manufactures in developing country exports grew from one-tenth in 1980 to almost two-
thirds in 2001. It increased sharply, but not equally, in all regions. The laggards included Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Middle East and North Africa, which have yet to reach 30 percent. Many countries, particularly the 
poorest, remain dependent on exports of agricultural and resource commodities. 
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Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were the origin of a strong expansion in international trade 
(Box 5.1). As detailed in Chapter 3 above, developing countries are now more integrated 
with the world economy than are high-income countries. 
 
Box 5.1: Trade policy over the centuries 
Protection of domestic industries has a long history. In the 12
th
 century, for example, to maintain the 
competitive edge of their textile industries, Flanders and England restricted the movement of 
experienced weavers. In the 13
th
 century, England enacted laws restricting the types and origin of 
fabrics certain individuals could wear. In 16
th
 and 17
th
 century France, the state promoted selected 
industries, through import protection, direct ownership, or subsidies, as did Japan later during the 
Meiji period. While the protection of domestic industries took various forms—such as subsidized 
capital, or monopoly or monopsony rights—protection from imports was the most widely used and 
became particularly important after the start of the industrial revolution. During the 1800s and first 
half of the 1900s, tariffs on imports in industrial countries were as high as 30-50 percent (World 
Development Report 1991). 
 
Many developing countries pursued import substitution industrialization strategies in the three 
decades that followed World War II, but by the mid-1980s, most developing countries were seeking 
to reduce their import protection and liberalize trade. Three developments had raised doubts about the 
long-run effectiveness of strategies based on import protection. First, in the 1960s, Korea and Taiwan, 
China, had begun adopting export-oriented growth strategies that not only yielded superior economic 
performance, but also helped these two economies to withstand the severe interest rate and oil price 
shocks of the 1970s. Second, high tariffs, administrative restrictions, and rationing of foreign 
exchange and of import licenses created high returns to rent seeking, reinforcing vested interests and 
an environment that stimulated corruption and weakened national institutions. The results, including 
state capture by vested interests and the misuse of government discretion, discredited import 
substitution strategies even among economists who believed in the strategic importance of import 
substitution in the initial phases of industrialization. Third, growth strategies based on import 
substitution proved difficult to implement in practice, and the practical and political aspects of 
implementation often negated most of the expected gains (Balassa 1971; Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 
1970). High nominal tariffs often provided negative protection to emerging activities and protection 
to activities with negative value added, and contributed to misallocation and underutilization of 
capital in capital-scarce economies. Overvaluation of the exchange rate resulting from import 
restrictions discouraged exports and penalized agriculture—further reducing the size of the market for 
import-competing industries. 
 
As a result, during the 1980s and 1990s virtually all developing countries followed the examples set 
by Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan: encouraging exports and reducing levels of 
protection. Industrialization based on import protection was gradually discredited and, starting in the 
mid-1980s, most developing countries sought to reduce levels of import protection and liberalize 
trade. Chile and Sri Lanka were among the first liberalizers, starting already in the 1970s. Argentina 
and Uruguay followed shortly thereafter. By the early 1990s, researchers and policymakers generally 
accepted the superiority of outward orientation over import substitution as a development strategy.
a
 
Trade liberalization expanded in the 1990s, leading to increased integration of developing economies 
in world trade. The fall of communism in central and Eastern Europe, together with the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union, reinforced this view. Countries that had not already embarked on 
liberalization began to do so now, while others scaled up their efforts. They included hitherto very 
highly protected and inward-looking economies such as India, and countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
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that looked to integration with the world economy as a key instrument for reversing hitherto dismal 
growth performance.  
 
While some of the reforms were unilateral, others were accomplished in the context of multilateral 
trade agreements such as the Uruguay Round. Important components of those reforms included large 
tariff reductions and the elimination of quotas, as well as the relaxation of restrictions on foreign 
investment. Looking at the improvement in market access for the developing countries, tariff cuts in 
industrial countries accounted for about a third of the improvement and tariff cuts in the developing 
countries themselves accounted for two-thirds (World Bank 2003b). 
 
a 
See Krueger (1997) and Baldwin (2003) for expositions on the evolution of economic thinking over this issue 
during the second half of the 20th century.
 
 
The integration of labor emerged as another important issue on the globalization agenda 
during the 1990s. In 2001, developing countries received some US$ 71 billion in migrants’ 
remittances—a sum that was nearly 40 percent more than all official development assistance 
and significantly more than net debt flows to developing countries in that year.2 However, 
such remittances went to only a few developing countries, and their importance for 
developing countries as a group declined over the 1990s, from slightly above 4 percent of all 
foreign exchange receipts to slightly below.3  
 
Remittances would provide a much larger share of foreign exchange receipts for developing 
countries were it not for industrial country restrictions on labor migration. If rich countries 
were to permit the temporary immigration of up to 3 percent of their total labor force, 
developing countries would gain as much as $160 billion a year (Walmsley and Winters 
2003).  
 
Virtually all commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services have focused 
mainly on the first three modes of international service delivery rather than on mode 4, the 
“movement of natural persons”, which involves the temporary movement of labor to provide 
services. Mode 4 accounts for only 1.4 percent of services trade (Figure 5.11). The lack of 
liberalization in labor services has been particularly costly to developing countries, whose 
                                                 
2
 World Bank (2003b), p. 139. These statistics are based on remittances sent through official channels. Existing 
payments systems make remittances difficult and costly, especially in and to Africa and Central America. To 
many parts of the world, unofficial remittances far outweigh official ones. 
3
 From 1990 to 2000, income from migrant workers overseas (including workers’ remittances and employees’ 
compensation) as a share of foreign exchange receipts (measured as exports of goods, services, and workers’ 
income) fell from 4.3 to 3.8 percent for all developing countries. Conceptually it makes sense to compare 
income from migrant workers with receipts from exports of goods and services since labor could be viewed as 
one form of a country’s service exports. Almost all of the drop for the developing world as a whole can be 
attributed to the decline in migrant workers’ income in Egypt3, which in 1990 had enjoyed the largest amount of 
this income in nominal terms in the developing world. The decline in migrant workers’ income in Egypt during 
the 1990s was Gulf War-related. Excluding Egypt, the ratio fell from 3.7 to 3.6 percent over the decade. 
Countries where incomes from migrant workers have become quite important—ranging between 20 to 46 
percent of total foreign exchange receipts in 2000—and where such income increased significantly over the 
1990s (increases ranging from 10 to 46 percent) include Albania, Ecuador, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Sudan, 
and Uganda. At the same time, however, countries including Benin, Cape Verde, Egypt, Lesotho, and Pakistan 
experienced declines in such incomes, ranging from 10 to 30 percent. 
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comparative advantage lies in the export of medium- and low-skilled, labor-intensive 
services. 
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28% 
14% 
57% 
1% 
 
Mode 1 (cross - border supply) 
Mode 2 (consumption  
abroad) 
Mode 3 (commercial  
presence) 
Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) 
Source :  IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook 
 
Figure 5.1: Temporary labor mobility, underused mode of trade in services 
(value of world trade in services by mode; percent) 
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, 2004. 
 
Trade reform, exports, and economic growth 
 
For decades, researchers have been debating the merits of economic openness and its 
association with growth. Academic debates on whether openness to trade causes higher 
growth are riddled with problems of measurement, reverse causation (faster growing 
countries tend to open their markets more quickly), and omitted variable bias (countries that 
successfully lower tariffs also adopt other complementary policies).4 Notwithstanding 
difficulties in interpreting country experiences during the1990s, almost all economists agree 
that liberal trade is important for growth over the long run (Box 5.2). 
 
Box 5.2: The trade and growth debate  
The debate among economists and policymakers over the relationship between trade and growth has 
risen to prominence during the last few years, due on the one hand to the mixed growth outcomes of 
developing countries that have undergone extensive trade liberalization and, on the other hand, to 
                                                 
4 Properly identifying the causal impact of changes in trade policies on growth needs to take into account other 
factors associated with GDP growth, and the fact that changes in trade policy are often driven by other 
changes—such as GDP growth. This means that the variable for trade policy should be “instrumented” or 
represented with measures that affect trade policy but are not correlated with GDP growth. Since most reforms 
are driven by initial protection levels, one way to get around the problem is to instrument the changes in tariffs 
in the 1990s with the initial tariffs that prevailed during 1986-90. The initial tariffs were found to explain 36 
percent of the changes in tariffs during the decade: countries with high tariffs in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
reduced tariffs by a higher percentage, while countries with already low tariffs reduced them less. The results, 
reported in Background Note 1 to this chapter, also control for some other policies that affected growth in the 
1990s, including exchange rate policies, government consumption, and inflation. 
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differences over data, econometric techniques, and model specifications among professional 
economists. 
 
The resurgence of interest in the 1990s among economists on the impact of trade on growth can be 
attributed to the significant improvements that have taken place in endogenous growth theory as well 
as to the availability of more comprehensive data and new econometric techniques. According to the 
new growth theory (attributed to Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; and Grossman and Helpman 1991), 
whether import protection raises or lowers the growth rate depends on the pattern of imports and 
exports. Economists on both sides of the debate accept that as a matter of theory the relationship 
between trade and growth is ambiguous. The issue is hence an empirical one, which has become the 
focus of the debate in the last few years. 
 
The launching of the debate can be attributed to Rodriguez and Rodrik (RR) and Harrison and 
Hanson (HH) who in two 1999 papers reviewed a number of empirical studies in the 1990s. While 
HH showed that the Sachs and Warner (1995) study reflected the gains from macroeconomic stability 
rather than trade reform, RR reviewed a number of studies, including Dollar (1992), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), and Edwards (1998). RR expressed doubt “that there is a strong negative relationship 
in the data between trade barriers and economic growth, at least for levels of trade restrictions 
observed in practice,” viewing “the search for such a relationship futile.” A unique feature of the HH 
and RR analyses was their use of the various authors’ actual data sets in testing the robustness of their 
results. HH and RR criticized the empirical studies on data grounds, on model-specification grounds, 
and on grounds of econometric techniques. Data problems included, among others, the use of poor 
measures of trade barriers (including the World Bank’s classification of trade regimes which they 
criticized as subjective in Edwards’ paper), and the use of measures that are highly correlated with 
other sources of bad economic performance such as poor exchange rate management (as in Dollar’s 
and Sachs and Warner’s papers). Separately, Rodrik also criticized one of the more recent papers on 
the topic, Dollar and Kraay (2001) on data and model-specification grounds. The data problem arises 
from the combination of policy measures (tariff averages) with outcome measures (imports as a share 
of GDP). The model specification problem arises from regressing income on trade shares when both 
are endogenous (outcome variables). 
 
 Notwithstanding these criticisms, it would be safe to say that most authors agree on the following: 
First, that trade protection is not good for economic growth. Even RR themselves state in their paper 
that they have seen no credible evidence to support the notion that trade protection is good for 
economic growth, at least for the post-1945 period.  
 Second, that trade openness by itself is not sufficient for growth. RR argue in their paper: that 
researchers and policymakers have been overstating the systematic evidence in favor of trade 
openness, when what is really necessary is to further identify the connection between trade and 
economic growth. 
 
Research that focuses on the relationship between trade reforms and economic growth in the 
1990s also finds that trade reforms are associated with higher growth, although the strength 
of the association varies across different studies.5 Yet trade liberalization by itself is not 
                                                 
5
 For example, Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2003); Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004); and Alcala and Ciccone (2004) 
all show a positive relationship between trade and growth, whereas Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) get mixed 
results. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) find a positive relationship between a composite measure of economic 
reforms and economic growth, but that relationship is not significant for the 1990s; nor do they isolate the role 
of trade policy per se, but look at the composite measure including exchange rate reforms. Their analysis is 
done in a panel context, since they measure the impact of changes in trade policy on economic growth. 
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enough for economic growth. Studies show that trade policy is most likely to be associated 
with positive outcomes when it is conducted in a favorable economic environment
6
, and that 
while lack of regulations can undermine the growth effects of trade, in countries with 
effective regulation the effects of trade reforms are positive for growth.
7
  
 
In developing countries that successfully integrated into the global economy in the 1990s, a 
variety of factors reinforced each other: a stable investment climate, greater market access, 
complementary macroeconomic policies, and unilateral or multilateral trade reforms.  
Table 5.1 illustrates how the trade intensity of economies changed in response to reductions 
in tariffs. In the countries that began the 1990s with very high tariffs, and reduced them the 
most, the share of imports plus exports in GDP rose significantly. But in countries that began 
the decade with more moderate tariffs and lowered them further, the responses varied widely. 
One possibility—consistent with the evidence presented in Table 5.1—is that at more 
moderate levels of protection, other changes in the economy play a growing role in 
determining changing trade shares. 
 
Table 5.1: Tariff reductions and changes in goods trade integration, 1990-2000 
 Change in integration, 1990-2000 
% changes in 
tariffs, late 1980s 
- late 1990s 
<1 times 
 
 
1-1.5 times 1.5-2 times >2 times 
40-70 reduction   India Bangladesh  Sudan  
20-30 reduction Pakistan, Burkina 
Faso 
Benin, Ecuador, Kenya, 
Peru, Thailand 
China  
10-20 reduction Egypt, Iran, 
Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Zambia 
Republic of Congo, 
Indonesia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Venezuela 
Argentina, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Sri Lanka 
Philippines 
0-10 reduction Tanzania, 
Paraguay, 
Senegal 
Bolivia, Chile, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, South 
Africa 
Ghana, Nepal  
0-2 increase Mozambique  Madagascar, Trinidad 
and Tobago  
Mexico 
2-10 increase Tunisia Jordan, Morocco, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia 
    
>10 increase Syrian Arab 
Republic 
     
Note: Trade integration, defined as the share of goods exports plus imports in GDP, is measured in real terms 
and excludes services trade. 
 
One important avenue through which tariff reductions in the 1990s contributed to economic 
growth is through their impact on exports. Figure 5.2 shows that tariff reductions in the 
1990s were positively and significantly associated with developing countries’ export shares. 
The positive association between tariff reductions and export growth is consistent with so-
called Lerner symmetry, whereby taxing imports has the same effect on international trade as 
                                                 
6
 See Wacziarg and Welch (2003) and Baldwin’s (2003) summary of the recent debate on the topic. 
7
 See Bolaky and Freund (2004). The authors measure excessive regulation using a World Bank survey on labor 
regulations and business entry regulations. They find that the benefits of expanding trade (as measured by trade 
shares) are offset by excessive regulations in the most regulated economies in the 1990s. 
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taxing exports.8 This means that reducing tariffs promotes exports. Cross-country regressions 
also suggest that in the 1990s real export growth was higher in countries with greater 
macroeconomic stability, countries that reduced tariffs more, and countries that had more 
effective government.
9
 
 
Detailed case studies reinforce these lessons on the determinants of export activity. Studies 
using detailed plant-level data have shown that manufacturing firms that move into exporting 
are frequently the most productive in an economy. Consequently, policies that encourage 
investments in human and physical capital, and that support technological change, are likely 
to promote export growth. Evidence for Morocco suggests that many exporters are new 
enterprises, so that policies that encourage new plant entry and at the same time ease the exit 
of inefficient enterprises are likely to play an important role. Evidence from Mexican and 
Indonesian censuses suggests that exporters are likely to use skilled labor, which suggests 
that policies supporting the development of human capital are important. 
 
Figure 5.2: Changes in export shares of GDP and changes in tariffs, 1990-2000  
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Note: Changes are for the ten-year period 1990-2000, not per year annual changes. The correlation 
coefficient is –0.25 and statistically significant.  
 
Plant-level studies and anecdotal evidence also point to the importance of foreign investors in 
helping developing country exporters to break into new markets. Recent studies control for 
the possibility of reverse causality, taking into account the fact that foreign firms may create 
or take over the most efficient firms.10 Even if the importance of foreign investment is 
                                                 
8
 Lerner symmetry in the two-good case can be illustrated as follows: Px/Pm(1+t) = [Px/(1+t)]/Pm, where 
Px=price of exports; Pm=price of imports; t=tariff. 
9
 Macroeconomic stability refers to the stability of the real effective exchange rate, as measured by the standard 
deviation, and average inflation. Government effectiveness refers to combined perceptions of the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of 
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The 
government effectiveness indicator is taken from Kaufmann et al. (2003), and based on 17 separate sources of 
subjective data on perceptions of governance constructed by 15 different organizations.  
10
 See Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997). 
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difficult to identify in cross-country studies, plant-level studies provide ample evidence that 
foreign ownership has been associated with export activity (Box 5.3). Studies on Indonesia, 
Mexico, and Morocco show that joint ventures and foreign-owned plants are significantly 
more likely to export than other types of enterprises. Although the mechanism is not 
completely clear, foreign firms are likely to provide knowledge of foreign markets and 
customer preferences, as well as access to new technology and financing opportunities. 
 
Box 5.3: The impact of foreign direct investment on growth 
Foreign direct investment has been an important force in the global integration of national economies. 
Countries welcome FDI for many reasons. Capital-scarce countries benefit from the infusion of a less 
volatile source of capital. Greater investment financed by incoming FDI should also translate into 
higher growth. Foreign investors are expected to provide employment opportunities, better wages and 
working conditions, and more training. Many countries give foreign firms and joint ventures special 
treatment in the expectation that these firms will transfer new technology and knowledge to domestic 
workers and firms.  
 
The cross-country evidence on the relationship between FDI and growth is mixed, in part because 
incoming FDI as a share of GDP is typically quite small. A cross-country study using data for 72 
countries for 1960-95 (Carkovic and Levine 2002) finds no evidence that FDI exerts a positive impact 
on economic growth independent of other growth determinants (openness, black market premium, 
financial development, initial income, years of schooling). However, Bosworth and Collins (1999) 
find that FDI, by raising total factor productivity, raises a country’s rate of output growth. 
Borenzstein et al. (1998) find that FDI adds to capital accumulation and raises the efficiency of 
investment, but only where the host country has a minimum level of human capital—an indicator of 
absorptive capacity. The Borenzstein study is consistent with evidence that suggests FDI can promote 
growth if the country has complementary institutions such as developed financial markets (Alfaro et 
al. 2003) or is open to trade (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996).  
 
A number of studies use micro-data to analyze the role of FDI in promoting technology transfer and 
raising host country wages (see, for example, World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000; 
Aitken and Harrison 1999; Haddad and Harrison 1993; Djankov and Hoekman 2000; Konings 2000; 
and Damijan et al. 2003). They provide a mixed picture. However, they all agree that affiliates of 
foreign firms are more productive than indigenous firms. While part of these results could reflect the 
fact that foreign firms acquire more efficient domestic enterprises, anecdotal evidence also suggests 
that local firms acquired by foreign investors undergo restructuring and improve their performance as 
a result of the takeover. This direct effect should not be ignored as its magnitude may be significant. 
Other evidence also suggests that foreign enterprises pay higher wages (Aitken et al. 1997) and are 
more likely to comply with local labor standards (Harrison and Scorse 2003). 
 
In sum, while quite a lot of evidence suggests that FDI is positively associated with growth, there is 
no consensus on the issue, and in particular no consensus on the direction of causality. Regardless of 
whether FDI independently contributes to growth, it is clear that policies and institutions that are 
important for growth would also be the ones that would attract FDI as well as enhance the impact of 
FDI on growth. Therefore, countries should focus on such policies and institutions rather than 
narrowly on how to attract FDI. 
 
The need for effective growth strategies 
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While trade integration opens new opportunities and can strengthen an effective growth 
strategy, it cannot ensure the strategy is effective. Liberalization of trade in Argentina in the 
1980s and 1990s, and in Chile in the early 1980s, for example, was accompanied by an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate that reduced the competitiveness of domestic industries 
and incentives to export—with adverse consequences for the balance of payments and real 
economy. In many countries of the former Soviet Union and some in Eastern Europe in the 
1990s, trade was liberalized while property rights were not well defined and the institutional 
base for a market economy was not well developed. These, and other institutional issues 
preventing the free movement of resources, often meant that trade reforms did not expand 
economic opportunities but restricted them instead (Bolaky and Freund 2004).  
 
Trade reforms are most likely to stimulate growth when they are part of a comprehensive 
strategy. Important elements of an effective growth strategy can include sound 
macroeconomic management, building of trade-related infrastructure and institutions, 
economywide investments in physical and human capital, greater access to developed and 
developing country markets, and maintenance of a sound rule of law. Because these elements 
are often difficult to implement, there has been excessive emphasis on trade policy alone, 
rather than as a component of an overall growth strategy. In addition to freeing markets and 
ensuring the institutional foundation of a market economy, governments may also need to 
address market failures that impede a supply response. Identifying which industries warrant 
special treatment is highly risky, and the experience of the last few decades is riddled with 
attempts to correct market failures that became more costly than the failures themselves. At 
the same time, however, governments have learned how to structure interventions in a 
manner that can reduce the risks of capture and failure. 
  
Although many factors contributed to the rise in trade integration in the 1990s, as discussed 
above, for brevity the following discussion is selective. It focuses on two critical 
complementary areas: macroeconomic stability and trade-related infrastructure and 
institutions.  
 
Macroeconomic stability 
 
Macroeconomic stability is an important element in successful outcomes from trade 
reforms.11 Macroeconomic stability entails low levels of inflation and a stable and 
competitive exchange rate. Exchange rate volatility creates a risky business environment in 
which future profits and payments are uncertain, and these risks are higher in the many 
developing countries that have not developed financial instruments for hedging against 
foreign exchange risk. 
 
Successful exchange rate management requires, inter alia, appropriate sequencing of trade 
reforms and capital account liberalization. Experience has shown that capital account 
liberalization should follow, not precede, the liberalization of trade, because the large inflows 
of capital that generally follow the freeing of the capital account could cause a large 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, leading to large import surges that destabilize 
domestic industries and the balance of payments. 
                                                 
11
 See Thomas and Nash (1992) and Nash and Takacs (1998). 
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India’s appropriate sequencing of trade reforms, as well as its maintenance of a stable 
macroeconomic framework, contributed to its impressive export and growth performance in 
the 1990s (World Bank 1994). Before starting to liberalize trade, in the early 1990s India 
allowed a significant depreciation of the real exchange rate, which served to increase export 
incentives and cushion the impact of lower import barriers on domestic industry. Trade 
liberalization preceded the opening of the capital account. Since 1992, India’s real effective 
exchange rate has remained at more or less the same level, facilitating trade reforms.  
 
In Zambia, by contrast, macroeconomic instability undermined the potentially positive 
effects of structural reforms. Trade and other structural reforms in the early 1990s gave 
Zambia one of the most liberal trade regimes in Africa, but export performance has been 
lackluster. An important reason is macroeconomic instability, with high inflation and high 
real interest rates, as well as a highly volatile real exchange rate. The latter reflected 
Zambia’s unsuccessful management of the large declines that took place in 1995 and 1997 in 
the prices of copper, its main export (World Bank 2003g). In Malawi, too, macroeconomic 
instability undermined export and growth performance. During the 1990s, high and volatile 
inflation, averaging 31 percent, resulted in an overvalued and highly volatile real exchange 
rate, seriously undermining domestic production, investment, and exports. Malawi’s 
manufacturing sector contracted by 9 percent during 1995-96. These developments hindered 
Malawi’s efforts to diversify its exports out of tobacco, where they remain highly 
concentrated (World Bank 2003d). 
 
Trade-related infrastructure and institutions 
 
Successful trade integration requires supportive infrastructure and institutions—the so-called 
behind-the-border agenda.12 A comparison of Jamaica and Mauritius illustrates the 
importance of institutions, as well as macroeconomic stability (Box 5.4). Two other 
important constraints are transport infrastructure and institutional capacity for meeting 
product standards. Globally, improvements in transport and communications, in conjunction 
with developing-country reforms, have allowed the production chain to be broken up into 
components, with some developing countries playing a key role in global production sharing, 
as noted in Chapter 3 above. 
 
Box 5.4: Jamaica and Mauritius: institutions and macroeconomic stability make the difference 
Jamaica and Mauritius had nearly the same per capita GDP in 1984. But between 1984 and 2000, real 
per capita GDP grew at around 4.8 percent a year in Mauritius, compared with only 0.7 percent in 
Jamaica. This is a dramatic difference in performance, given the many similarities between the two 
countries. 
 
Both countries have similar natural endowments and historical legacies. Both are island economies, 
have tropical climates, are subject to natural shocks (hurricanes in Jamaica and cyclones in 
Mauritius), and are former British colonies with English as the official language. Their economic 
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 Tsikata (2003). This study summarizes the findings of diagnostic trade integration studies undertaken during 
2001-03 for twelve least developed countries (Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Senegal, and Yemen). 
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structures are similar, with around 6 percent of GDP from agriculture, around one-third from industry, 
and the remaining 60 percent or so from services. Sugarcane is widely grown in both countries, and 
both enjoy preferential access to the EU and US for sugar exports. Both established export-processing 
zones centered on garment manufacturing, with the primary impetus provided by East Asian 
investors. 
 
The disparate growth performance cannot be attributed to differences in trade: between 1985 and 
2000, real annual growth of exports was 3.9 percent in Mauritius and 3.6 percent in Jamaica, and by 
2000, trade accounted for a larger share of GDP in Jamaica than in Mauritius. Jamaica has geographic 
advantages for trade, being much closer to the US and the EU than Mauritius is to either. Jamaica 
surpasses Mauritius in education enrollment indicators. And through the 1990s, Jamaica enjoyed 
higher FDI as a share of GDP than Mauritius. 
 
Two factors that may explain the difference in growth performance are institutional quality and 
macroeconomic stability. Subramanian and Roy (2001) point to Mauritius’s superior institutions 
(democracy and strong participatory institutions), and ethnic diversity, which provided important 
links to the rest of the world (68 percent of the population is Indian), and the need for participatory 
political institutions that were important for maintaining stability, law and order, rule of law, and 
mediating conflict. Looking at indicators of institutional quality (Kaufmann et al. 2002), Mauritius 
outperforms Jamaica in all but one (regulatory quality): Mauritius does better in government 
effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, control of corruption, and voice. The rule of law is a 
particular problem in Jamaica, with crime and violence costing at least 4 percent of GDP (excluding 
dynamic costs) (World Bank 2003c). Unlike Mauritius, Jamaica has lacked a social/political compact; 
though recently the labor unions have agreed with the government to limit their wage increases in 
response to the grave economic situation. 
 
Mauritius outperformed Jamaica in macroeconomic stability for the two decades from 1980 to 2000, 
in terms of the level of inflation and the stability and competitiveness of the real exchange rate. In the 
1990s, Jamaica’s poor management of adverse macroeconomic developments seemed to more than 
offset the potentially positive effects of a substantial trade (and capital account) liberalization. 
Financial crisis in the mid-1990s worsened the already deteriorating fiscal performance, and 
dramatically enlarged the ratio of debt to GDP. This has dampened private sector confidence, 
government investment, interest rates, and growth. 
 
In many other countries, however, transport remains a key bottleneck. Markets that are 
isolated may feature little competition and may fail to realize economies of scale or scope. 
The result is typically a vicious cycle of low productivity and low profitability. Such 
constraints severely limit the growth potential of the poorest countries, where agriculture 
supplies 15 to 52 percent of GDP. In addition, since most of the poor reside in rural areas, 
these constraints have serious negative effects on poverty. For exporters in some developing 
countries, transport is the single most important component of cost.
13
 The main issues related 
to transport are lack of competition and inadequate investments. Transport costs are further 
raised by formal and informal fees and checkpoints. Poor transport particularly affects 
agricultural producers (mainly smallholder farmers and herders) who have difficulty 
accessing markets both domestic and external. In Malawi, for example, high transport costs 
have weakened the competitiveness and profitability of firms and farmers. Malawi is an 
efficient producer of sugar, but domestic transport costs account for 15 percent or more of 
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 The discussion in this paragraph is based on Jaffee and Sutherland (2003). 
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local consumer prices, and for sugar exports, regional and international transport costs add 
nearly 50 percent to the ex-mill production costs (World Bank 2003e). Lack of competition 
in road transport (where Malawi has restrictions on foreign operators) and high transport 
taxes add substantially to transport costs. 
 
Product standards in international trade have proliferated and become more stringent in 
recent years. Consumers in developed countries are demanding stricter food standards, while 
major food retailers, food manufacturers, and restaurant chains have been adopting codes of 
practice, standards, and other forms of supply-chain governance as part of their commercial 
strategies of differentiation. Increasingly, middle-income and some low-income countries are 
also raising their product standards, in part through the investments undertaken by 
multinational supermarket or restaurant chains and competitive responses by local firms.  
 
Prospects are dim for “special and differential treatment” that would require less stringent 
standards from poorer countries (Jaffee and Henson 2004). Developing countries need to 
develop and improve their food safety and agricultural health management systems to 
position themselves competitively and to enhance their export performance. Building such 
capacity is not beyond the reach of developing countries, and some very poor countries are 
meeting exacting international standards. Examples include Peruvian exports of asparagus to 
the US and the EU, and low-income African countries’ exports of fish products that meet EU 
hygiene standards. Countries that meet strict export standards are generally those where the 
private sector is well organized and the public sector well focused to meet exporters’ needs, 
such as through outgrower programs for smallholder farmers, systems of training and 
oversight for small and medium-sized enterprises through associations and groups, and 
twinning and regional networking for small countries. 
 
2. Different paths to trade reform 
 
This section discusses issues related to the path of liberalization, including the success of 
different partial approaches to trade liberalization; managing the political economy of trade 
reform; whether there is a limited role for infant industry protection, and the pros and cons of 
regional trade agreements. 
 
One element is common to almost all of the success stories: despite the diversity of 
approaches to trade reform, all successful liberalizations either explicitly or implicitly 
promoted export growth. Exporters were given incentives to ensure that selling on 
international markets was as attractive as domestic sales. This required establishing a regime 
that offset the anti-export bias. In turn, this required an effectively functioning bureaucracy to 
implement the offsetting regulation—as with the “indirect duty drawbacks” in Korea. This 
proactive approach is not generally prescribed. Since most countries lack the institutional 
capacity that is required to implement offsetting regulation, classic trade liberalization—
through low, uniform tariffs and the elimination of quantitative restrictions—has been the 
more conventional recommendation. 
 
Partial trade liberalization: China and India 
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China opted for partial trade liberalization, pursued through a dual-track approach. Special 
economic zones (SEZs)—one of the drivers in China’s export and growth success—were set 
up in the 1980s to provide the firms established within them access to duty-free imported 
inputs. Firms outside the SEZs faced much higher tariffs on imports, at 56 percent in 1982, 
falling to 44 percent in 1991and 16 percent in 2000 (Lardy 2002). 
 
China established its first four SEZs in 1980 in two coastal provinces (Guangdong and 
Fujian), selected for their location.14 The success of the initial zones led to the addition four 
years later of 14 coastal cities (including Shanghai) as “coastal open cities,” with authority 
similar to that of the SEZs. By 1992, most cities along the Yangtze River and the borders of 
China had been granted special privileges as coastal cities, with Shanghai being granted even 
more autonomy. These developments, in turn, spurred the establishment of “development 
zones” in many inland cities that extended tax benefits and autonomy to foreign and domestic 
investments. In many cases, such zones were established without the approval of the central 
government.15 In 1993 China became the world’s second largest destination for FDI, next to 
the US. Compared with other regions, the SEZs enjoy lower tax rates and greater authority in 
approving foreign investment projects. The removal of administrative barriers had nearly as 
great an effect in spurring trade as China’s tariff reductions, which did not really begin until 
the 1990s. Exports grew at an annual average of 15 percent in the 1980s, and at 19 percent in 
the 1990s.16 
 
India followed a different model of partial liberalization, liberalizing trade across all regions 
of the country but relaxing protection one sector at a time. After piecemeal efforts at 
liberalizing trade during the 1980s, India launched a coherent trade reform program in 1991, 
with some faltering during 1997-2001.17 The reforms entailed concurrent reductions of some 
of the highest tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the world. A large reduction in NTBs 
and the streamlining of a very complex import licensing regime came early in the reform 
program, while tariffs were reduced in a phased manner, with reductions continuing today. 
Currently, the maximum customs tariff for non-agricultural goods is 30 percent, scheduled to 
be reduced to 20 percent or less in the near future.18 Capital and intermediate goods imports 
were liberalized first, and consumer goods (which were effectively banned) not until several 
years later. It was not until 2001 that all consumer goods imports were liberalized.19 
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 Information in this paragraph is from Qian (2000). 
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 The autonomy given to local governments in China is a very important factor in this development. This 
autonomy is provided in the form of the “fiscal contracting system” introduced between 1980 and 1993, under 
which provincial governments are provided incentives to build up local economies and their own revenue bases. 
Specifically, the incentives arise from allowing the provinces to keep the lion’s share of the increases in 
revenues at the margin. Data from the reform period of 1982-91 show that the correlation coefficient between 
the provincial budgetary revenue and expenditure is 0.75, compared to 0.17 in the pre-reform period of 1970-79 
(Qian 2002). Another study (Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2001) found that such incentives were indeed 
significant—both for the growth of employment of non-state enterprises as well as in the reform of state 
enterprises. 
16
 Qian (2002); Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2001). 
17
 A result of the increasing import competition from East and Southeast Asian countries that devalued their 
currencies in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. 
18
 These tariffs underestimate true import competition since there are also specific tariffs. 
19
Although imports of several agricultural goods, making up 40 percent of Indian agricultural GDP, continue to 
be controlled by state trading enterprises. 
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India’s sequencing of trade liberalization, which entailed earlier liberalization of capital and 
intermediate goods than for consumer goods, and much steeper reduction in tariffs for some 
of them, was intended to discourage the deferment of investments that might occur if 
domestic producers expected further reductions in capital goods tariffs.20 The response was 
rapid:  in dollar terms, exports were growing by 20 percent annually within three years of the 
start of the reform program. The strong export supply response provided impetus for a 
continued response, not least because the new export receipts alleviated the pressures on the 
balance of payments.  
 
Factors that were clearly important for the trade reforms adopted by China and India were the 
credibility of reforms and the importance of strong institutions. Some ways to achieve reform 
credibility are discussed below.  
 
Political economy of trade reforms 
 
The success of trade reforms is not automatic. Political economy considerations need to be 
taken into account at the design stage if reforms are to be sustainable. The key elements on 
the political economy front are to ensure that the costs of adjustment arising from reforms are 
eased, and that reforms are credible.  
 
Easing the costs of adjustment 
 
Easing the costs of adjustment is clearly important to generate social and political support for 
reforms. One way to ease adjustment costs is to ensure that safety nets are adequate to 
compensate losers. But, as discussed earlier, a more efficacious way is to design a reform 
program that minimizes adjustment costs.  
 
China and Mauritius provide good examples in this regard, by creating new profit 
opportunities at the margin while leaving old opportunities undisturbed. The upshot was that 
there were no identifiable losers. In China, few vested interests opposed the SEZs because 
these were set up outside the scope of central planning and did not disrupt planned 
production and allocation. China’s approach also maximized political support for the reforms 
as the number of winners grew over time. Mauritius partially liberalized trade by establishing 
export processing zones (EPZs) and segmenting the labor market (Subramanian and Roy 
2001). Labor market rules were much less stringent in the EPZs than elsewhere in the 
economy. Until the mid- to late-1980s, employers had greater flexibility in dismissing 
workers in the EPZ sector, and in the 1980s, EPZ wages were about 36-40 percent lower than 
wages in the rest of the economy, with the differentials narrowing to 7-20 percent in the 
1990s. Aside from acting as a subsidy to exports, the segmentation of the labor market also 
prevented the expansion of the EPZs from driving up wages in the rest of the economy and 
disadvantaging the import-substituting industries. 
 
Ensuring credibility 
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 World Bank (1994). 
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At the very least, reforms should be publicly communicated so that economic agents are 
aware of them and can respond accordingly. Mozambique lifted export restrictions on 
cashew nuts but with very little communication to those directly affected by the reforms, so 
that few cashew nut farmers were aware that substantial reforms had been undertaken.21 As a 
result, much of the price increase that resulted from the reforms went to the traders, and the 
supply response was constrained. Had farmers been told of the reforms, they could have 
strengthened their bargaining power vis-à-vis the traders, making it difficult for the latter to 
pay low prices. Public communication of reforms also diminishes the possibility of reform 
reversals, boosting their credibility. 
 
Another way to boost the credibility of reforms is to undertake measures that are less easy to 
reverse than price changes. In Mozambique, another reason why the supply response was 
poor was that cashew nut processors did not make investments to improve their efficiency, in 
part because they expected the reforms to be reversed. The overall reform program would 
have been more credible had the price reforms been accompanied by non-price reforms, such 
as government investment in transport, better access to credit, promotion of competition in 
cashew marketing, and the creation of incentives to adopt improved technologies for cashew 
growing. Such non-price interventions strengthen credibility by signaling to the public a 
government’s commitment to the reforms. 
 
Further ways to promote credibility include the establishment of institutions such as India’s 
Tariff Commission, which is charged with the design and implementation of the trade reform 
program and has a tenure that outlasts governments. Such long tenure helps to enhance the 
credibility of reforms, as it diminishes private sector expectations that the reform program 
will be reversed by successive governments. Finally, credibility can also be achieved through 
signing on to regional trade arrangements that lock in reforms. 
 
Should emerging industries be protected? 
 
Although import substitution policies have been largely discredited, the need to address 
market failures that prevent the development of internationally competitive industries has 
continued to provoke debate. Suggestions have been made to grant temporary modest levels 
of import protection where there is a demonstrated need (Williamson 2004). Other authors 
have focused on choosing the right form of protection, advocating subsidies to the initial 
entrants rather than the use of import duties (Baldwin 2003). 
 
Another suggestion is to approach development as a process of “self discovery”, since the 
key challenge that a modernizing economy faces is to learn what it is good at producing 
(Hausmann and Rodrik 2002). The entrepreneur who first discovers what the country should 
specialize in can capture only a small part of the social value that this knowledge generates, 
because other entrepreneurs will quickly emulate such discoveries. Thus this type of 
entrepreneurship will typically be undersupplied and economic transformation delayed. 
There may be a role for government involvement to provide incentives to induce such 
investments, as well as to exert discipline in pruning investments that turn out to be costly.  
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A key challenge for countries that choose to pursue such a strategy is to structure the right 
combination of incentives (inducements) and discipline (competitive pressures, resistance 
against special interests). Some of the world’s most successful economies during the last four 
decades (South Korea and Taiwan, China since the early 1960s; China since the late 1970s) 
prospered by pursuing policies that gave inducements for investment and risk taking while 
expanding competitive pressures that ensured efficient allocation by investors. During their 
industrial drives in the 1960s and the 1970s, South Korea and Taiwan provided export 
subsidies contingent on export performance. This strategy allowed policymakers to 
distinguish firms and sectors that were highly productive from those that were not. The 
subsidies included supplying inputs, providing working capital, imposing import restrictions, 
and—in the Taiwanese textile industry in the 1950s—buying the resulting output. Local 
production grew spectacularly as a result. But the government also pruned non-productive 
firms subsequently. 
 
Asia’s successful experiences in this regard contrast with the generally failed experiences of 
Latin America. Pursuing import substitution strategies in the 1960s and the 1970s, Latin 
American governments provided incentives without sufficient discipline, with the result that 
too many low-productivity firms operated alongside the high performers. When trade 
openness and domestic competition brought discipline in the 1990s, producers received too 
little support (Hausmann and Rodrik 2002). Without a good balance between promotion and 
discipline, Latin American countries’ industrial performance fell short of that in East Asian 
countries during these decades. 
 
Chile has often been touted as a miracle of free-market economics. In fact, public-private 
collaboration strategies have played a key role in fostering structural change and stimulating 
non-traditional activities (Box 5.5). Yet identifying the conditions for successfully assisting 
new activities is not easy. Rodrik and Hausmann (2003) emphasize the importance of 
creating an institutional architecture that resists the pull of special interests, and the 
importance of political leadership from the top. Whatever institutions are employed to 
support new activities, they must be transparent and accountable, or selective support is 
likely to evolve into a new mechanism for supporting private interests in the name of public 
gain. The promotion of new activities should conform to a set of design principles that 
include the following: (1) incentives should be provided only for new, “sunrise” activities, 
not sunset ones; (2) there should be clear benchmarks for success or failure; (3) support must 
have a predetermined end (a so-called sunset clause); (4) public support should target 
activities such as worker training or infrastructure investment, rather than sectors such as 
electronics; (5) subsidized activities should provide clear potential for externalities; (6) 
agencies involved in these activities should be autonomous enough to avoid capture by 
private interests, but should maintain links with the private sector to maximize economywide 
gains. This is not a prescription for creating new state enterprises, promoting existing 
activities, or giving governments authority to expand their bureaucratic reach. Clearly, the 
institutional and administrative requirements for success are formidable. 
 
Box 5.5: Behind Chile’s success: a less than orthodox approach 
Chile appears to be the exception among Latin American countries by striking the right balance of 
inducements and discipline in promoting domestic industry. 
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Fruits and salmon, Chile’s two largest export items after copper, have both benefited from private-
public sector partnerships. The foundations of the fruit industry were laid in the early 1960s through 
the efforts of the Corporacion de Fomento, the University of Chile, and the National Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA). INIA, established in 1964 with highly-paid skilled researchers, 
initiated the fruit research program. The public sector carried out much of the development of 
scientific personnel and knowledge to achieve technological transfer; identification, and planting of 
new varieties suitable for export to foreign markets; improvements in orchard and post-harvest 
management; and the development of the infrastructure necessary to export fruit to foreign markets. 
Private investment and exports took off after the reforms of the mid-1970s once uncertainties 
regarding land reform, macroeconomic stability, and labor militancy were resolved. They were 
further boosted by the sharp real depreciation of the currency in the mid-1980s. 
 
The salmon industry, which generates $600 million in annual exports and provides jobs for more than 
100,000 people in this country of 15 million, also benefited significantly form public interventions. It 
was created single handedly by Fundacion Chile, a non-profit institution created by the Chilean 
Government in 1976. Fundacion Chile brought the technology of salmon farming to Chile, adapted it 
and made it commercially viable, formed private sector businesses to use it, and eventually sold its 
participation to Japanese investors at a great profit. 
 
Sources: Rodrik and Hausmann (2003); Ocampo (2004); and Washington Post, January 21, 2004. 
 
A role for regional agreements?  
 
Some countries have achieved greater integration and strong growth by adopting unilateral or 
multilateral trade reforms combined with participation in regional trade agreements. Signing 
on to regional trade agreements provides countries with access to the markets of fellow 
members, and can help improve their domestic institutions. But evidence suggests that as 
many as half of regional trade agreements are substantially trade-diverting. Trade and 
investment diversion cause significant economic losses to the countries excluded from the 
agreements. 
 
Regional integration has yielded good results for central and eastern European countries that 
signed Europe Agreements in the 1990s with the European Union, and for Mexico, which 
joined the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For the central and eastern 
European countries, the institutional harmonization aspect of the Europe Agreements has 
been very important for successful trade integration and growth (World Bank 2000a); 
agreements on harmonization of investment policies, regulatory rules, and institutions with 
those of European Union members have encouraged export-oriented foreign direct 
investment into the CEE countries. In Mexico, NAFTA has had positive effects on trade, 
foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and growth, and is also associated with 
productivity improvements in manufacturing. But although NAFTA has contributed to 
institutional harmonization between Mexico and the US in the areas that it covers—in 
particular intellectual property rights, investor protection, and environmental standards—it 
has not helped to narrow other institutional gaps, especially in the areas of rule of law and 
corruption, which are nonetheless important for income convergence between the two 
countries (Perry et al. 2003). 
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Evidence suggests that for developing countries, signing on to regional trade agreements with 
developed countries, particularly large developed countries, is most useful. Agreements 
should also strive to ensure that barriers vis-à-vis other countries are kept low. Signing such 
agreements will not generate positive export and growth responses unless the countries 
themselves also pursue other necessary economic, political, and social reforms. Among the 
EU accession countries in the 1990s, benefits only accrued to those countries that were also 
undertaking the necessary economic, political, and institutional reforms to transform their 
economies into market-based ones.22 For example, Bulgaria and Romania signed Europe 
Agreements in 1993, in advance of several other accession countries, but they lagged behind 
in the transition process and fared much worse in economic performance compared to 
Estonia and Slovenia, which signed such agreements in 1995 and 1996, respectively.  
 
Most importantly, regional trade agreements can divert attention away from the multilateral 
WTO process, and result in higher costs than benefits for developing countries.23 This will be 
especially true if the agreed upon protection vis-à-vis third parties remains high. Recent 
experience with the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement, and the US-Australia Free Trade Agreements suggests that regionalism will not 
help the developing countries much with their market access priorities: trade-distorting 
agricultural support in the North, contingent protection, and liberalization of temporary 
migration of labor. Further, the high costs of negotiating such agreements divert resources 
away from such larger multilateral issues. 
 
3. Trade liberalization, poverty, and income distribution  
 
Despite expected gains for the economy in the longer term, trade reform generates both 
winners and losers in the short run.24 The critical question is whether the short-run costs of 
trade reform fall disproportionately on the poor. Economists in the 1990s expected trade and 
foreign investment reforms to help developing countries reduce poverty. Trade liberalization 
was expected to increase demand for goods produced by developing countries’ poor or low-
skilled workers, leading to higher wages for unskilled workers and ameliorating poverty. 
Trade reforms were also expected to raise the prices of the agricultural products produced by 
the poor and to reduce prices of goods that the poor consume. Is the emerging evidence from 
the 1990s consistent with these expectations? How much of the decline in poverty rates and 
increasing within-country inequality can be attributed to the trade reforms of the 1990s?  
 
Effects of trade reform on aggregate growth and poverty 
 
Direct effects 
 
If opening up to trade is associated with higher growth, then it may be associated with a 
decline in poverty. This argument rests on two assumptions: first that opening up to trade 
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 This discussion is taken from World Bank (2004); see also Stiglitz (2004). 
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 See Harrison (forthcoming), Winters et al. (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (forthcoming) for 
comprehensive surveys. 
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leads to higher growth and second, that growth raises the incomes of the poor as much as the 
incomes of the rich. 
 
What actually occurred? There is widespread evidence that GDP growth reduces poverty.
25
 
In other words, evidence suggests that growth benefits those at the lower end of the income 
distribution. If trade liberalization contributes to growth—as discussed earlier in this 
chapter—then it should be associated with reductions in poverty. China and India, for 
example, have both experienced tremendous increases in trade integration and growth, as 
well as large reductions in poverty. From 1980 to 2000, real per capita GDP grew at an 
annual average of 8.3 percent in China and 3.6 percent in India, while trade integration (trade 
in goods and services in real terms as a share of GDP) rose from 23 to 46 percent of GDP in 
China, and from 19 to 30 percent in India. Over this period, both countries massively reduced 
the incidence of poverty—from 28 to 9 percent between 1978 and 1998 in China, and from 
51 to 27 percent between 1977-78 and 1999-2000 in India.
26
 Since a large share of the 
world’s poor live in these two countries, these large reductions have served to reduce or 
mitigate overall inequality in the world.
27
 
 
Nevertheless, Harrison (2005) suggests that policymakers need to be cautious about 
expecting large gains in poverty reduction from trade reforms.28 Many economists expected 
that developing countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled labor would benefit 
from liberalization of trade through increased demand for their unskilled labor-intensive 
goods, which in turn should reduce inequality and poverty. However, the evidence in this 
volume—which includes 15 separate studies of the links between poverty and 
globalization—suggests that the story is more complex. One reason is that labor is not nearly 
as mobile as simple trade models assume. If comparative advantage is to increase the 
incomes of unskilled workers, they need to be able to move out of contracting sectors and 
into expanding ones. A second reason is that developing countries have historically protected 
their unskilled-intensive sectors, so that trade reforms may lead to less protection for 
unskilled workers relative to skilled. A third reason is that even firms in countries with a 
comparative advantage in producing goods that use unskilled labor need to use skilled 
workers in order to compete in global markets. 
 
Indirect effects 
 
Trade reforms can also affect poverty indirectly, for example by influencing (1) the job 
opportunities and wages of the poor; (2) the prices that poor consumers pay for the goods that 
they buy; (3) government revenues and in turn social expenditures that particularly affect the 
poor; and (4) income instability as well as workers’ chances of becoming poor (Winters et al. 
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2004). Even if aggregate poverty falls or remains constant, many households may move into 
or out of poverty as a result of trade liberalization. 
 
Effects on jobs and wages. Some studies have found that trade reforms reduce employment in 
the short run, but others have found that trade reforms increase employment over the long 
run, as expanding sectors create new employment opportunities. Trade explains much of the 
decline in Singapore’s unemployment rate, from more than 9 percent in the 1960s to close to 
2 percent in the late 1990s. A study of 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over 
the period 1970-96 found that trade liberalization had a negative, though small, direct effect 
on employment.
29
 The negative effect was greater in countries where the real exchange rate 
appreciated as a result of capital inflows that followed the economic reforms. Similarly, in 
Brazil in 1990-97, trade liberalization slightly reduced employment in the short run, but the 
more labor-intensive output mix that resulted over the long run increased employment.
30
 
Much larger negative effects on output and employment have been found in some African 
countries. One study for Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe found that most firms responded to 
import competition pressure by contracting rather than upgrading aggressively.
31
 Among the 
suggested reasons for such behavior are the firms’ lack of preparation for competition, 
absence of policies to promote technological improvement (especially among small and 
medium enterprises), and poor technological and human infrastructure. 
 
Trade reforms of the 1990s in Latin America and the Caribbean reduced employment in 
previously protected industries and augmented it in others (De Ferranti et al. 2001). 
Argentina lost much of its automobile industry while seeing an expansion in more 
sophisticated chemicals and capital- and labor-intensive manufactures. Brazil lost much of its 
cereals industry to Argentina under Mercosur, and its manufacturing industry suffered more 
generally. Costa Rica lost much of its labor-intensive manufacturing to Mexico after 
NAFTA, but it also substantially increased its manufacturing of computer chips. In each case, 
substantial numbers of workers lost their jobs, and some experienced either very long periods 
of unemployment, or large wage losses, or both.  
 
As emphasized by De Ferranti et al. (2001), such dislocations are transitional and do not 
imply a permanent increase in the unemployment rate. Chile, for example, experienced 
double-digit rates of unemployment for several years after liberalization, but from 1986-97 
its unemployment rates were among the lowest in the region. Mexico’s present rate of 
unemployment is roughly at its traditional level, despite that country’s dramatic economic 
integration with the US. 
 
Although most studies find that the unemployment effects of trade liberalization tend to be 
temporary, even short-term costs can be high in human terms. Such costs must be addressed 
through a variety of policy approaches, including stronger social safety nets, in order to 
ensure that trade reforms succeed. 
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Effects on prices. An emerging literature using household-level data suggests that, via 
changes in factor and goods prices, trade liberalization can lead to poverty reduction. For 
instance, a recent study of trade liberalization in Argentina using household survey data 
found that Mercosur has benefited the average Argentine household across the spectrum of 
income distribution.
32
 The same study also finds that Mercosur has had a pro-poor bias, 
benefiting poor households more than middle-income households, and that its impact on rich 
families is positive but not statistically significant. The reason behind these results is that 
Argentine trade policy protected the rich over the poor prior to the reforms, and granted some 
protection to the poor after the reforms. 
 
Effects on social spending. Social spending is another avenue through which liberalization 
may affect income distribution, but there is no direct evidence for such a relationship. The 
available evidence, relating mostly to the 1980s
33
, suggests that many trade reforms had no 
revenue costs. Some of the main reasons were that temporary tariff surcharges were 
introduced when quantitative restrictions were removed, and that changes in the 
import/export base arising from the trade reforms enhanced revenues. For example, Kenya’s 
trade liberalization between 1989-99 (which entailed halving the simple average import duty 
rate over the period and abolishing import licensing requirements and foreign exchange 
controls) led to increases both in duty as a share of imports, and in import duty revenues as a 
share of GDP. The increase in revenues reflected the expansion of the revenue base, tighter 
exemption management, higher duty rates on certain products, a shift in imports to the higher 
duty classes, and possibly also improvements in customs administration and the introduction 
of a pre-shipment program. (Glenday 2000, cited in Winters et al. 2002). 
 
Even where revenues are cut, available evidence suggests that public spending important to 
the poor can be protected. There are alternative sources of revenues—though caution needs 
to be exercised to ensure that replacement taxes do not hurt the poor. And, with political will, 
social spending, particularly that oriented towards the poor, may be shielded. 
 
Effects on vulnerability and income volatility. When Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand opened 
up to trade in the late 1980s and early 1990s, no strong negative effects on poverty and 
vulnerability resulted.
34
 It remains an open question whether openness made the 1997-98 
Asian financial crisis much more serious than the shocks that had hit the three countries in 
the 1980s. It is clear, however, that financial crises are very costly to the poor. In Indonesia, 
the financial crisis of 1997 led to a 50 percent reduction in real wages.35 In Mexico, the peso 
crisis of the mid-1990s led to a stagnation in real wages that lasted nearly a decade. A recent 
study of financial deregulation across countries emphasizes the need for complementary 
policies, such as the creation of reliable institutions and macroeconomic stabilization policies 
(Prasad et al. 2004). While financial crises resulting from unrestricted capital flows are 
associated with a higher likelihood of poverty, foreign direct investment inflows are 
associated with a reduction in poverty. The poverty-reducing effects of FDI are clearly 
documented in several recent studies on India and Mexico.  
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Summarizing the links between trade reforms and poverty 
 
What lessons emerge from cross-country and more detailed case studies using household 
data? First, the poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization where 
complementary policies in place. Case studies of India and Colombia in Harrison (2005) 
suggest that globalization is more likely to benefit the poor if trade reforms are implemented 
in conjunction with labor market deregulation.36 In Zambia, poor farmers are only expected 
to benefit from greater access to export markets if they also have access to credit, technical 
know-how, and other complementary inputs.37 The same volume also points to the 
importance of social safety nets. In Mexico, trade reforms in the 1990s hurt the poorest corn 
farmers; without support from the government, these farmers’ real incomes would have been 
halved.38 The same result has been found more recently in Ethiopia.39  
 
Second, while financial crises are associated with increasing poverty, reforms in trade and 
foreign investment in a number of countries have helped to reduce poverty. In Mexico, the 
poor in the most globalized regions have weathered the macroeconomic crises the best.40 In 
India, opening up to foreign investment was associated with a decline in poverty. In 
Colombia, increasing export activity was associated with an increase in compliance with 
labor legislation and a fall in poverty. In Poland, unskilled workers—who are the most likely 
to be poor—have gained from the accession to the European Union.41 
 
Clearly, globalization produces both winners and losers among the poor. Winters et al. 
(2004), Ravallion (2004), and Harrison (2005) all emphasize this heterogeneity in outcomes. 
It should not be surprising that the results defy easy generalization. The poor can gain from 
one set of policy reforms, if those lower the prices they pay for consumption goods, and lose 
from other trade reforms that lower the prices of the goods they produce. Poor wage earners 
in exporting sectors or in sectors with incoming foreign investment gain from trade and 
investment reforms; conversely, workers in previously protected sectors are likely to lose.  
 
This emerging evidence on the links between trade reforms and poverty points to the need for 
carefully targeted social safety nets and complementary policies to ease the transition of 
workers from contracting to expanding sectors.  
  
Trade liberalization and inequality 
 
Though inequality has been increasing in both rich and poor countries we still lack a 
comprehensive understanding of why. A popular explanation is that technological change—
which may or may not be associated with opening up to trade—has led employers to demand 
more skilled labor. This phenomenon, referred to as skill-biased technical change, has 
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occurred in both developed and developing countries. Some economists argue that the 
demand for more skilled workers is unrelated to trade liberalization, since the same trend has 
been documented in services that are not traded on world markets, but others argue that skill-
biased technical change is itself an outcome of globalization. 
 
One reason why trade reforms may be associated with increasing inequality is that many 
countries—Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and Poland, for example—have traditionally 
protected the sectors that use mainly unskilled labor.  
 
Another possible reason is that exporters—who benefit from trade reforms—need to hire 
skilled workers in order to succeed in world markets. A number of studies have shown that 
exporters are more likely to use a high proportion of skilled workers, suggesting that as 
countries turn to exporting, the demand for skilled workers will rise, pushing up their wages 
relative to those of unskilled workers.42 Foreign firms in developing countries tend to hire 
more skilled workers relative to domestic firms. In Mexico, increasing inequality is most 
evident in the border region—the region most affected by increasing trade with the United 
States. 
 
Nevertheless, the evidence on trade liberalization and wage inequality remains inconclusive. 
In Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, the industries that are 
most exposed to international competition pay the highest wages. It is difficult to distinguish 
the impact of globalization from that of technical change, since the adoption of new 
technologies could be stimulated by external competition via trade. In Mexico, for example, 
the tripling of manufactured exports during the 1990s has been associated with increased 
rates of adoption of modern production technologies, an acceleration of productivity growth, 
a relative increase in the demand for skilled labor, and an increase in inequality.  
 
There is no evidence that trade liberalization permanently worsens income distribution. As 
noted above, however, there is evidence that trade liberalization has been associated with—at 
times significant and prolonged—adjustment costs in the form of employment losses. In 
Mexico, trade integration through NAFTA, while reducing poverty, has also increased 
income inequality between regions: regions with lower per capita GDP and higher telephone 
density grew faster, while regions with high public employment grew more slowly (Perry 
2003).  
 
Governments need to help the disadvantaged by strengthening social safety nets and by 
providing education and training for the unskilled. As attested by the industrialized countries, 
it is a daunting task to build up the administrative and institutional capacity required to 
design and implement safety nets that are well targeted and that avoid leakages. More 
innovative approaches to trade reforms and trade reform assistance packages may be needed.  
 
4. Issues of differential market access 
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After the reforms of the 1990s the world trade system is more supportive of development. 
But it remains strongly biased against the poor. Global markets are most hostile to the 
products the world’s poor produce—agriculture, textiles, and labor-intensive manufactures. 
Escalating tariffs, tariff peaks, and quota arrangements maintained by both developed and 
developing countries systematically deny the poor market access and skew incentives against 
adding value in poor countries. In both rich and poor countries, protection remains heavily 
concentrated in the most politically sensitive areas—textiles, clothing, other labor-intensive 
manufactures, and agriculture. 
 
Differential treatment by developed countries still constrains the expansion of trade by 
developing countries, particularly the poorest. In developed countries, the relatively low 
average tariffs mask the sometimes high protection in the form of tariff peaks, tariff 
escalation, specific duties, and production subsidies. 
 
Developed country protection is much more pronounced in agriculture than in manufacturing 
(World Bank 2003b). Since most of the world’s poor live in rural areas and work in 
agriculture, rich country subsidies combined with trade protection to domestic agriculture 
worsen world poverty. Farm production subsidies in the United States, for example, are 
distributed overwhelmingly to the richest farmers, exacerbating income inequality in 
agriculture and favoring wealthy landowners. Developed countries impose higher tariffs on 
agricultural imports from developing countries than from other industrial countries (Table 
5.2). Developed countries impose an average tariff of 15 percent on agricultural imports from 
other industrial countries, but average tariffs ranging from 20 percent (for Latin America) to 
35 percent (for Europe and Central Asia) on agricultural imports from developing countries. 
The issue of agricultural protection, in particular in cotton, has risen in prominence in 
multilateral trade talks, and was one of the main reasons for the failure of the most recent 
round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks (in Cancun in September 2003). Since then, 
Brazil has gone to the WTO with charges that US subsidies on cotton are inconsistent with 
WTO obligations, and the WTO ruling on April 2004 affirmed Brazil’s charges.43 
 
On manufactured goods, tariffs are on average lower in developed than in developing 
countries, but the types of goods exported by poor countries face higher tariffs in the rich 
countries. For example, while exporters of manufactures from industrial countries face, on 
average, a tariff of 1 percent on their sales to other industrial countries, exporters from 
developing countries pay anywhere from 2 percent if they are from Latin America (where the 
North America Free Trade Agreement weighs heavily) to 8 percent if they are from South 
Asia.  
 
Overall, rich countries collect from developing countries about twice the tariff revenues per 
dollar of imports that they collect from other rich countries. Protection also takes forms other 
than tariffs—among them quotas, specific duties, and contingent protection measures such as 
antidumping duties. As with tariffs, these measures tend to be used more frequently against 
labor-intensive products from developing countries. Antidumping duties are on average 
seven to ten times higher than tariffs in industrial countries, and around five times higher in 
developing countries. Developing countries are also hampered in other critical areas, 
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including access for their agricultural and textile exports, and restrictions on international 
labor migration. 
 
Table 5.2: Rich countries levy higher tariffs on poor countries’ exports  
(1997 protection rates facing exporters in each region, in percent) 
 
 Importing region 
Exporting region East 
Asia 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Middle 
East 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Industri
al 
Agriculture 
Industrial 
East Asia 
Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
33.3 
31.0 
24.2 
42.1 
 
23.0 
16.6 
26.7 
43.7 
30.3 
36.4 
36.0 
 
43.4 
34.6 
20.3 
20.1 
15.5 
23.8 
14.8 
 
14.9 
13.7 
14.4 
65.4 
45.3 
55.3 
50.3 
 
76.4 
41.1 
39.1 
16.4 
38.4 
34.2 
29.7 
 
31.8 
27.7 
30.9 
24.0 
19.0 
12.7 
24.7 
 
18.9 
11.0 
33.6 
15.3 
30.5 
35.1 
20.4 
 
23.4 
25.8 
23.6 
        
 East. 
Asia 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
Middle 
East 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Industri
al 
Nonagriculture 
Industrial 
East Asia 
Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
7.4 
8.2 
6.4 
4.3 
 
5.4 
7.1 
4.4 
9.6 
13.8 
6.4 
6.7 
 
11.5 
11.0 
6.1 
8.5 
15.1 
11.4 
15.4 
 
8.8 
13.6 
11.7 
10.4 
12.2 
8.6 
8.9 
 
11.4 
10.2 
6.1 
25.2 
28.1 
25.8 
19.4 
 
33.6 
19.0 
27.6 
12.2 
14.5 
12.8 
11.9 
 
11.7 
17.4 
20.6 
1.0 
5.1 
5.9 
2.1 
 
6.0 
8.1 
4.2 
Source: Weighted averages calculated using GTAP Version 5 Database (www.gtap.org). Most-favored-nation 
rates except for major free-trade blocs such as the European Union and the North America Free Trade Area. 
 
To continue the momentum towards greater global integration, high-income countries must 
further open their markets to developing country exports. Industrial countries’ unfair tariff 
treatment of developing countries must be addressed in the upcoming Doha round of trade 
negotiations.  
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